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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT

This Court has jurisidiction pursuant to UT AH CONST. ait. VIII, § , which
provides ... this court has the duty and the authority to "govern the practice of law,

v;

including admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons
admitted to practice law." The order of suspension appealed from was entered on
July 15, 2015. Respondent filed his motion to stay or amend the order on August
10, 2015. This Petition for Review was timely filed on November 12, 2015, after
the trial court denied the post decision motions on October 13, 2015.
ST ATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that Respondent violated Rule 8.4( c),
for engaging in conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty or
misrepresentation.
The Standard of review is that This Court reviews interpretations of its Rules
of Professional Practice for correctness and the Supreme Court affords no
deference to a district court's interpretation of the rules of professional
conduct. Nemelka v. The Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah
Supreme Court, 2009 UT 33,212 P.3d 525.

·.~

II.

Whether the District Court erred in finding that Respondent violated Rule
8.4(d), of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Standard of review is the same as stated under Issue No. I.

III.

Whether the district court erred as a matter of discretion in denying the stay
1

of suspension pending appeal.
The Supreme Court reviews sanctions involving lawyer discipline de
novo. In re Discipline of Johnson, 48 P. 3d 881, 886-87(UT 2002).
IV.

Whether the district court erred in finding that Respondent's conduct toward
the Martinezes violated the rules of professional conduct 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4(a).
This standard of review is the same as stated under Issue No. I.

V.

Whether the district court erred in finding there were no mitigating factors
against the sanction of suspension and in imposing a two year suspension on
Respondent for violation of the rules of professional conduct.
The standard of review is this Court is free to decide what discipline is
appropriate for a lawyer, without deference to a trial court's findings. In re

Discipline o(Ennenga. 2001 UT 111, rJ 9-10, 37 P.3d 1150.
VI.

Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in denying Respondent's
motion to dismiss because of the delay in imposing sanctions in this matter.
The standard of review is that this Supreme Court does not defer to the
lower court on issues of law or the interpretation of its rules of practice.
Nemelka, 212 P.3d at 527.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Rule 13-8.4(c), S.Ct. R.Prof'l. Practice,, reads:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
Rule 13-8.4(d), S.Ct. R.Prof'l. Practice, reads:

2

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice
Rule 13-1.1, S.Ct. R.Profl. Practice, (Competence) states:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation
Rule 13-1.3, S.Ct. R.Prof l. Practice, (Diligence) states:
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.
Rule 13-l.4(a), S.Ct. R.Profl. Practice, (Communication) states:
(a) A lawyer shall:
( a)( 1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance
with respect to which the client's
informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these
Rules;
(a)(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which
the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
(a)(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;
(a)(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;
and
(a)(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the
lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects
assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation.

3

Rule 14-50 I (c), (d) see appendix;
Rule 14-51 l(f);, which reads:
(f) Sanctions hearing. Upon a finding of misconduct and as soon as
reasonably practicable, within a target date of not more than 30 days
after the district court enters its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, it shall hold a hearing to receive relevant evidence in aggravation
and mitigation, and shall within five days thereafter, enter an order
sanctioning the respondent. Upon reasonable notice to the parties, the
court, at its discretion, may hold the sanctions hearing immediately
after the misconduct proceeding.
Rule 14-518, S.Ct. R.Profl. Practice,. See Appendix.
Rule 14-601, S.Ct. R.Profl. Practice,
Rule 14-605, S.Ct. R.Prof l. Practice,
Rule 14-607, S.Ct. R.Profl. Practice,
Rule 17, UT App. Proc., see Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE.
This case involves attorney discipline. Respondent S. Austin Johnson was
._;;;

suspended for two years from the practice of law by the Hon. Fred D. Howard, trial
judge, in the formal disciplinary complaint filed by the Office of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar in the Fourth District Court in Utah County, Utah.
Respondent seeks reinstatement of his license to practice law .

.B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
1.

OPC initiated a fom1al complaint against Respondent on March 23,

2012. RP at 1-17; and, an amended complaint on May 2, 2013. RP at 56-77. OPC
claimed Respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct in representing the
Mercados, Jose Casas and the Martinezes. Respondent answered on April 9,
2012, RP at 18-19; and, on July 16, 2103, RP at 81-82.

,.,....

The trial court issued two Notices of Intent to Dismiss against OPC

because it failed to go forward with the cause of action. RP 32-33; RP at 90-91.
3.

Finally, the trial court had a formal hearing on the OPC complaint

against Respondent on or about January 14-15, 2015.
4.

The trial court found on March 3, 2015, that Respondent violated certain

rules of professional conduct and scheduled a Sanctions hearing. It entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on this date. RP at 205-226. One day

4

after they had been filed by OPC. RP at 184-204. It found that OPC failed to meet
its burden of proof on the complaints by Jose Casas and those charges were
dismissed. Id.
5.

The Sanctions hearing was held on April 6, 2105. RP at 290-291. OPC

and Respondent filed their sanctions brief on March 30, 2015. RP at 243-265; and
RP at 266-280.
6.

The trial court took the matter under advisement. It did not issue a ruling

until June 15, 2015. RP at 333-346. On the same date it issued a notice saying it
"declined to sign order (Proposed Findings of Fact, conclusions of Law and Order
of Probation." RP at 347-361.
7.

The Ruling said it did not become final until July 15, 2015. RP at 362-365.

8.

Respondent, on August 10, 2015, applied for a stay pending appeal and for

a motion to dismiss or to reinstate the appeal time. RP at 368-390.
9.

The trial court denied Respondent's motions on October 13, 2015. RP at

494 to 498.
10.

Respondent filed a Petition for Review to this Court on November 12, 2015.

RP at 499-510.
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C. DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT.
The trial court dismissed the charges in Count II, concerning Jose Casas.
Then it found Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4(c ), with regard to the
;J

Mercados and the Martinezes. Finally, it found that Respondent violated Rules
8.4(c ), and 8.4(d), with regard to the Mercados. It ordered that Respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two years and it denied the request to stay
the suspension pending this appeal.

RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD.
11.

Respondent moved his office five times in the last seven months of

2009. Mercado v. Hill, 2012 UT App 44, para. 5. This changing of office led to
the problems in the Mercado case. Respondent failed to maintain good contact
with clients at that time, missed phone calls, was delayed in working on client's
~

cases and in filing change of address forms with the courts. He missed responding
to requests for admissions, which were served in September 2009. Id., para. 3;.
[Respondent's] Prehearing Brief re Sanctions, RP at 266-280, at page 7-8.
12.

Five other disciplinary proceedings arose during this same time

period when Respondent had problems with moving his office. Those five
·-..ii)

complaints were informal screening panels and were resolved with a public
reprimand, which Respondent accepted. RP at 277.
13.

The Mercados insisted that Respondent represent them on their
6

appeal and in motions to reconsider with the trial judge. The motions and appeal
were unsuccessful. Mercado, supra.
14.

Mercados complained to the bar because of Respondent's conduct on

August 25, 2010. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 25, filed January 15, 2015. RP. 512.
This complaint was one year after Respondent's negligence had occurred.
15.

This formal complaint process in Mercado continued from June 2010 to

June 15, 2015. OPC never sought any injunction against Respondent to stay his
practice of law while the complaint continued through the court. RP 5 5 to 77.
16.

Martinezes wanted Respondent to file a complaint against the Salt

Lake County SWAT team for excessive force when they searched the Martinez
house in doing a drug raid. RP 5 5 to 77.
17.

Respondent withdrew from representing the Martinezes because they

did not satisfy demands from Respondent including paying costs for the lawsuit,
taking steps to become legal in the country, and because they were unmanageable
and disorderly in Respondent's office. Respondent returned their file and resigned
as their attorney. He took them to find new counsel for them. But then, after
requests from the Martinezes, Respondent volunteered and prepared a pro se
complaint for them to file. They failed to meet at the courthouse when they had
agreed so they could pay the filing fee and sign the documents. Respondent placed
the documents in the night deposit box and told the Martinezes to go to the clerk's
7

office in the morning to sign the documents to go forward as pro se parties.
[Respondent's] Prehearing Brief re Sanctions, RP at 266-280, at page 13.

ARGUMENT

Summary of Argument
This disciplinary case arose in 2009. Respondent was moving his office,
trying to decide if he could practice law from a home office. He saw it was not
possible because he dealt with a large number of immigrants. He had developed a
Spanish-speaking clientele. His practice was limited to Immigration and some
personal injury claims that came from the same client base. He saw he needed
office help to keep up with the large numbers of customers who looked for him.
Unfortunately, during that short experiment and learning period, he did not have
good communication with his numerous clients. Also, he charged a flat fee for the
work so he had developed a practice where he could not produce time entries for
every phone call. This unsettled time resulted in a group of five clients filing
complaints with the Utah State Bar about his failure to communicate and lack of
diligence on their cases. Respondent accepted the complaints and accepted public
reprimands without really challenging the findings of the informal screening
panels.
Unfortunately, at the same time, he had a personal injury case for the Oscar
Mercado family. He neglected the litigation because of all the turmoil in his
8

practice. His neglect resulted in him overlooking, or not receiving, requests for
admissions served by counsel for defendants until they were deemed admitted.
The admissions basically stated the defendants had not caused the motor vehicle
accident and the Mercados caused it. Furthermore, they admitted the Mercados
were not injured. But the accident resulted from one of the defendants colliding
into the rear-end of the vehicle driven by the Mercados, who were stopped, on
Interstate 15.
Respondent did not challenge the five earlier 2009 OPC public reprimands
because he saw his problem and believed he could repair his practice by
establishing a stable office. Respondent, in going forward with this appeal, does
not seek to minimize his neglect in the Mercado case in failing to deny the requests
for admissions, which caused the dismissal of the case. But he contends the trial
court improperly imposed legal standards or interpretations of this Court's rules of
professional conduct that are wrong, over-bearing and inappropriate under the facts
in this case. The trial court's erroneous application of these rules resulted in a two
year suspension of Respondent from the practice of law. These applications of the
rules are afforded no deference on appeal. This Court should find that Respondent
did not violate Rule 8.4(c)(conduct that was dishonest or fraudulent) and Rule
8.4(d)( conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), nor did he violate any
rules with regard to the Martinezes because he was not their attorney so he did not
9

owe them any duty. Likewise, the Court should find that the two year suspension
~

was inappropriate and the trial court should have granted the stay of suspension
pending this appeal. The trial court likewise failed to properly balance aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.

I.

The trial court erred in finding that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c), for
engaging in conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty or
misrepresentation.

The standard of review is that the Supreme Court review of district court
cases concerning attorney discipline are different from judicial review of other
district court cases. The Supreme Court has its unique knowledge of the nature of
the practice of law and the nature of disciplinary actions. The Supreme Court
.;;;

reserves the right to draw inferences from basic facts which may differ from the
inferences drawn by the lower court. Also, the Supreme Court does not defer to
the district court in deciding what may constitute appropriate discipline. In re
Johnson v. OPC, 214 UT 57, citing to In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah
1990). Lundgren, 355 P.3d 984,987, 2015 UT 58 (2015), citing In re Discipline
of Crawley. 2007 UT 44, ,r 17, 164 P.3d 1232 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also In re Discipline of Corey. 2012 UT 21, ,r 23 n. 13,274 P.3d 972.

Furthermore, this Court reviews interpretations of its Rules of Professional Practice
for correctness and the Supreme Court affords no deference to a district court's
~

interpretation of the rules of professional conduct. Nemelka v. The Ethics and
10

~·

Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, 2009 UT 33, 212 P.3d 525; In

re Welker. 2004 UT 83, ~ 11, 100 P.3d 1197; See also State v. Gallegos. 2001 UT
81, 'iI 8, 171 P.3d 426.
Determinative law: Rule 13-8.4(c), S.Ct. R.Prof l. Practice,, reads:
Rule 8.4. Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
Here, the trial court found Respondent failed to communicate with Mercado
concerning the status of the case. It ruled that:
"Mr. Johnson violated Rule 8.4(c) ... in terms of [his] response
to Mr. Mercado relative to the motion for Summary Judgement and its
proper and correct status. He had a duty to communicate in clear
terms the status of the case, which was that it was in peril.
In re Discipline of Johnson, Civ. No. 120400436, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order of Suspension in filed June 15, 2016, (herein called "Resp.
Discipline Ord." at_) p. 6. The trial court also said Respondent's dishonest or
selfish motive was that he "failed to give Ms. Mercado a complete picture of the
status of his case when Mr. Mercado confronted him with the dismissal motions,"
and motions were inadequately briefed. Id. P. 8.
The trial court erred in finding Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c). Rule
8.4(c ), requires a level of scienter to find a violation. A"scienter" requirement

11

means that a person had "the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud".

Fibro

Trust Inc. v. Brahman Financial, Inc., 1999 UT 13, 97 4 P .2d 288, 293 ( 1999). See
also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668
( 1976). Utah cases applying Rule 8.4(c), have required some level of sci enter
before they found an attorney had violated this rule. For example, in In re
Discipline of Tanner, 957 P.2d 1233, 1237 (1998), the attorney committed theft.
His conviction of a crime showed his intent to defraud. In re Discipline of Babilis,
951 P .2d 207, 211 ( 1997), Mr. Babilis violated Rule 8.4(c), because he converted
and misappropriated estate funds, billed for nonexistent costs, and charged
paralegal time as his own. His conduct showed an intent to defraud. And finally,
~

in In re Discipline of Doncouse, 2004 UT 77, 99 P.3d 837, 839 (2004) the attorney
showed an intent to deceive and manipulate the court by filing a paper in court for
a client when he was not authorized to practice law, and by filing an affidavit of
compliance falsely stating that he had complied with the courtts order of
suspens10n.
Other jurisdictions like Iowa find that commission of a crime by a lawyer
shows he acted with some level of scienter in violating Rule 8.4(c). In Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591,605 (Iowa 201 lt In
another Iowa case, Mr. Wheeler pied guilty to knowingly making a false statement

·..:)

to a financial institution. This conduct involving misrepresentation was a violation
12

of rule 32:8.4(c). IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY
BOARD v. WHEELER, 824 N.W.2d 505 (2012).
This Court should find that a violation of Rule 8.4(c), requires a level of
scienter before the court finds a violation. This standard is consistent with other
jurisdictions. For example, in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v.
Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591 (Iowa 2011), and Iowa Supreme Court Attorney
Disciplinary Board, v. Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 580, 587 (Iowa 2011), attorneys said
they would return a retainer to a client after they failed to do any work on the
client's case. The atton1eys never returned the retainers as promised. The bar
claimed the misrepresentations or false statements violated Rule 8.4(c),
Professional Conduct. The Supreme Court of Iowa held the attorneys did not
violate this rule because [first] a violation required a reasonable level of sci enter to
find that an attorney violated it. Citing G. C. Hazard, Jr., et al., The Law of
Lawyering§ 65.5, at 65-15 (3d ed. 2009 Supp.). The Iowa court held that "in the
legal sense, a misrepresentation usually requires something more than negligence.
Black's Law Dictiona,y 1091 (9th ed.2009). The level of scienter must be greater
than negligence to find a violation of rule 32:8.4(c)." Netti. supra. at 605.
And Second, the Iowa Supreme Court reasoned that when an attorney's
conduct violates a specific rule involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
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misrepresentation, it would not find the same conduct to also violate a general rule
prohibiting that conduct, such as rule 8.4(c). Id
Here, the trial court inferred Respondent had an intent to deceive,
'v;;J

manipulate or defraud from the negligent communication in the case. Mere
negligence cannot be the basis for a violation of this rule. Netti, supra. OPC has
failed to prove, and the court did not find, any level of scienter greater than
negligence for the violation of Rule 8.4( c). No crime was committed as in Tanner,
supra; Babilis, supra; nor was there illegal practice of law as in Doncouse, supra.
Respondent's negligent communication with Mercados was without any scienter.
This negligent communication may even be less severe than the attorneys who
promised to return the client's retainers and never did. Netti, supra. Even if
Respondent failed to fully inform Mercados about the peril their case was in, such

,~

conduct was negligence, and does not support an inference of evil intent.
Furthermore, the violation under Rule 1.4(c ), for the same conduct of
negligent communication precludes a claim that negligent failure to communicate
was also conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. The
more specific rule violation should control and negate the more general claim that
Respondent's inadequate communication shows his dishonesty, fraud or deceit._
Netti. supra, at 605.
The trial court erred in finding Respondent violated Rule 8.4( c).
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II.

The District Court erred in finding that Respondent violated Rule
8.4(d), of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The standard of review is this Court reviews interpretations of the Rules of
Professional Practice for con-ectness and the Supreme Court affords no deference
to a district court's interpretation of the rules of professional conduct. Nemelka v.
The Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, 212 P .3d 525
2009 UT 33 (2009); In re Welker, 2004 UT 83, ,i 11, 100 P.3d 1197; See also State
v. Gallegos. 2007 UT 81, ,I 8, 171 P.3d 426.

Determinative law: Rule 13-8.4(d), S.Ct. R.Profl. Practice, reads:
Rule 8.4. Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
Judge Hansen ruled that Respondent violated this rule by filing three
motions that requested the Court [in the Mercado matter] reconsider its decision
and withdraw the summary judgements and quash the admissions that were
deemed admitted. Respon. Discipline Ord. at 6.
Rule 8.4( d), seeks to protect from prejudice the administration of justice in a
much broader sense than in any single trial or adjudicatory proceeding. In re
Comfort, 159 P.3d 1011, 1026 (Kansas S. CT 2007); see also Grievance
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Administrator v. Fieger, 416 Mich. 231, 719 N.W.2d 123 {2006), cert. denied,_
U.S.

, 127 S.Ct. 1257, 167 L.Ed.2d 75 (2007) (attorney's comments violated

disciplinary rule prohibiting undignified, discomteous conduct toward tribunal,
rule requiring respect toward all persons involved in legal process). In another
case, Mr. Pyle, an attorney trivialized the disciplinary sanction in a letter to 281
friends and clients, and said it was just a "slap on the hand." The "unrestrained
statements" violated Rule 8.4( d) by "prejudic[ing] justice in a general sense by
lessening the public confidence in our disciplinary system." In re Pyle, 156 P.3d
1231 (S CT Kansas, 2007). The Pyle court emphasized that the "administration of
justice" Rule 8.4(d) seeks to protect from prejudice is much broader than the
~

administration of justice to be effected in any single trial or adjudicatory
proceeding. Id. At 1247. The Pyle court explained its rationale as follows:

[If Rule 8.4(d) were really about litigation], then such a view would
effectively exempt all non-litigator lawyers from the rule's control, a
nonsensical result. All lawyers, by virtue of their licenses, enjoy the
status of officers of the court. That status brings with it the
responsibility to refrain from conduct unbecoming such officers, to
uphold the rule of law, and to enhance public confidence in that rule
and the legal system set up to safeguard it.
Id.
The conduct regulated by Rule 8.4( d) is generally attorney speech and
conduct outside of the courtroom, during, or after the litigation is over. See Matter

of Palmisano, 10 F.3d 483, 485-87 (1th Cir. 1995) (attorney disciplined for making
many baseless accusations, among other times, after being relieved as counsel in
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case); In re Crenshaw. 815 N.E.2d 1013, 1014-15, (Ind. 2004) (untrue allegations
against judges, during and after proceedings, merit sanction); Kentucky Bar
Association v. Williams. 682 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Ky.1984) (disrespectful letter

written to judge after hearing warrants discipline); In re Holtzman, 573 N.Y.S.2d
39, 42, 78 N.Y.2d 184,577 N.E.2d 30 {1991) (dissemination of letter of complaint,
press contacts after proceeding concluded "prejudicial to administration of
justice").
In this case, Judge Hansen found Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d), merely
by his motions filed in litigation in the case of Mercado v. Hill. There, Respondent
made various motions to advance judicial economy. He filed motions to
reconsider rulings before the rulings became judgments. He filed motions under
rule 59 and motion to reconsider summary judgment before the final judgment was
entered. The policy behind Respondent's actions in the Mercado case was simple
judicial economy. Respondent sought to permit the trial court to correct any
mistakes prior to entry of final judgment. He considered his motions were more
cost-effective and quicker than an appeal. He tried to convince Judge Laycock to
correct her rulings while she still had control over the case by applying a correct
view of the facts. These motions were not prejudicial to the administration of
justice. This practice is acceptable in the litigation process. See JOHNSON v.
GOLD'S GYM, 2009 UT App 76, 206 P.3d 302 (2009), where [a] trial court's
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decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider summary judgment is within the
·~

discretion of the trial court, and the Com1 will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse
of discretion. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996) (emphasis

~

omitted); accord Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ii 16, 163 P.3d 615.
Likewise, in Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, the Court held that district courts may
"reconsider or revise nonfinal judgments, which have no impact on the time to
appeal and are sanctioned by our rules. See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (providing that
when a case involves multiple claims or parties, any order or other decision that
does not adjudicate all of the claims is subject to revision at any time before a final
judgment on all the claims)."
In this matter, Judge Hansen found that Respondent filed three motions in
essence requesting that Judge Laycock in the Mercado case reconsider her decision

..i)

before it became final and appealable. Judge Hansen found that the multiple
filings filed by Respondent in the Mercado case "were not legitimate advocacy,
were not encompassed by the rules and served to cost thousands of defense costs,
or incur thousands of defense costs." Respon. Discipline Ord., p. 6, 8.
How could Judge Hansen make such a finding when this was not a finding
in the Mercado case or in the appeal of the Mercado case? The trial court findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and order of dismissal in the Mercado matter were
entered on June 11, 2010. See Pet. Ex. 23. The six page decision is absolutely
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silent of any allegations of abuse of process by Mr. Johnson in the motions he
filed. Judge Laycock did not refer this matter to OPC for prosecution of a claim of
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Likewise, Respondent
appealed the dismissal of the Mercado matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. See
Pet. Ex. 24; Mercado v. Hill, 2012 UT App 44. The court of appeals did not ever
contend that Respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the
administration of justice. It criticized Respondent's numerous errors in the
litigation and appeal, of which Respondent is very ashamed. But it did not allege
such conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. It did not refer the
matter to the OPC for such a violation.
Judge Hansen's findings do not discuss Respondent's neglect in the
Mercado litigation, but he focuses only on motions filed by Respondent, trying to
get Judge Laycock to reconsider her rulings. The only issue is whether the motions
in Mercado were prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Utah precedent clearly supports the idea that Rule 8.4(d) protects judicial
administration as an institution and not in a particular case. For example, In Re
Discipline of Harding. 2004 UT 100, 104 P.3d 1220, 1225-26 (2004), Judge
Harding was charged with using controlled substances while he sat on the bench in
the Fomth District. He loudly declared his innocence, which was widely repm1ed
in the media and disseminated to the general public. He did so with "full
19

knowledge of his culpability ... his aggressive public statements themselves
exacerbated the damage his conduct caused." Id. He violated Rule 8.4(d), by
harming the judicial system with his statements. He was not cited for violating the
~

rule by pleading innocent to the criminal information when the charges were
brought against him, nor for filing excessive number of motions in his own defense
of his case. His offensive conduct arose outside of his own litigation.
In State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484,490 (UT App 1991), the court of appeals
gave another example of how Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) addresses
the institutional interest of administration of justice. It was concerned with the jury
trial appearing fair to all who observe them. Id. The court held" impugning a
lawyer's integrity before a jury in a criminal trial is a violation of this standard.
See Hobson, 612 F.2d at 828, Id. at 829.''

The trial court in this matter erred in finding that Respondent's motions filed
in the Mercado litigation violated Rule 8.4(d), because such filings were
permissible and the conduct did not offend the institution of judicial
administration.

III.

The district court erred as a matter of discretion in denying the stay
of suspension pending appeal.

20

The Supreme Court reviews sanctions involving lawyer discipline de
novo. In re Discipline of Johnson, 48 P. 3d 881, 886-87(UT 2002).

Determinative law: Rule 17, UT App. Proc.; Rule 14-518, S.Ct. R.Profl.
Practice,. See appendix.
The only issue that should preclude a stay is if this Court were to find that
there is a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public if the stay is granted.
In In re Discipline of Johnson, 48 P. 3d 881, 886-87(UT 2002); In re Discipline of
Crawley, 2007 UT 44, ,r,i 7, 14, 164 P.3d 1232; Utah State Bar v. Jardine, 289
P.3d 516, 2012 UT 67 (2012). This standard for denying a stay is similar to the
standard the OPC must apply in seeking temporary interim suspension while an
attorney is in disciplinary proceedings. Rule 14-518, Prof. Conduct.
Respondent, on August 10, 2016, filed a motion to stay the suspension
pending the appeal. The trial court denied the stay. It held:
The OPC noted "seven matters" previously handled by Mr. Johnson
that resulted in disciplinary action. This Court views Mr. Johnson's
prior disciplinary history with great concern. Mr. Johnson has not
alleviated this Court's concerns that he poses a substantial threat to
the community by his continued practice of law.
Ruling Re: Application for Stay and Motion to Dismiss, p. 3-4, filed Sept. 9,
2015. The trial judge applied the wrong standard for denying the stay pending
appeal. He only looked at whether there was substantial threat to the community.
But the standard is whether the threat is of"irreparable harm to the public."
OPC did not feel Respondent's conduct arose to such a level so it did not seek
21

interim stay pending the proceedings. Judge Hansen erred in failing to consider
~

the proper standard when he denied the stay.
The refusal to stay the suspension pending the appeal has resulted in the

viJ

death of Respondent's law practice and his reputation. Respondent had $1 million
in professional liability coverage. The insurer cancelled the coverage. Respondent
has lost his income. He was able to get a hardship modification for his home loan
or he would have even lost his house where he has lived for 15 years.
The trial court only found a "substantial threat" to the community. But he
failed to make any finding of a threat of "irreparable harm" so the denial of the
stay should be reversed pending the appeal.

IV.

The district court erred in finding that Respondent's conduct
toward the Martinezes violated the rules of professional conduct 1.1,
1.3, and 1.4(a).

The standard of review is this Court reviews interpretations of the Rules of
Professional Practice for correctness and the Supreme Court affords no deference
to a district court's interpretation of the rules of professional conduct. Nemelka v.
The Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, 212 P.3d 525
v)

2009 UT 33 (2009); In re Welker, 2004 UT 83, ,I 11, 100 P.3d 1197; See also State
v. Gallegos. 2007 UT 81, ~ 8, 171 P.3d 426.

Determinative law: Ch. 13, Rule 1. 1, S.Ct. R.Prof'l. Practice, (Competence)
states:
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A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation
Ch. 13, Rule 1.3, S.Ct. R.Profl. Practice, (Diligence) states:
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.
Ch. 13, Rule l.4(a), S.Ct. R.Prof l. Practice, (Communication) states:
(a) A lawyer shall:
(a)(l) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance
with respect to which the client's
informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these
Rules;
·
(a)(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which
the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
(a)(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;
(a)(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;
and
(a)(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the
lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects
assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation.
The trial court found that:
MARTINEZ MATTER

Mr. Johnson violated rule 1.1 (Competence) in the Martinez
matter by performing little work on behalf of his clients until just
before he believed the four year statute of limitations would run on
their claim in 2012. He failed to competently represent the
Martinezes when he filed a prose complaint in the Federal District
Court's overnight drop box. Mr. Johnson filed the complaint in the
Court's drop box without the Martinezes' review, signature or consent
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and without the required filing fee . . . The unsigned complaint also
failed to meet the requirement that all complaints be signed any an
attorney or party ...
(Violation of Rule 1.3(Diligence))
Mr. Johnson violated Rule 1.3 (Diligence) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. ...
Mr. Johnson violated Rule 1.3 (Diligence in the Martinez
matter by performing little work on the clients' case until just prior to
the time he believed the statute of limitations would run on their
claim. Mr. Johnson also failed to provide the prose complaint far
enough in advance to allow himself time to meet with the Martinezes
to review the complaint and properly instruct them on how it should
be filed.

-~

The trial court also ruled the Mr. Johnson violated rule l.4(a),
[Communication] in the Martinez matter by failing to keep the
Martinezes fully informed about the current status of their case. Mr.
Johnson led the Martinezes to believe that he would file their
complaint but did not file the complaint. He did not adequately
communicate otherwise until he informed them by text message he
would only prepare a pro se complaint for them shortly before they
believed the statute of limitations would run on their claims. He also
failed to adequately communicate with the Martinezes about whether
they still wished to pursue their complaint prose and what steps they
needed to take to make that happen before he placed the complaint in
the Court's drop box.
Respon. Discipline Ord. p. 3, 4.
These three rules, competence, diligence and communication, all begin with
the requirement that the attorney owes these duties to a client. Respondent did not
represent the Martinezes. This fact was confirmed in the text messages to the
Martinezes. OPC Exhibit 30, p. 2 of 3, says:
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#17 ... good Luck. U will get ur complaint to file prose tomorrow.
Austin

# 11 I have the complaint ready for u to file in Court. I will meet u
and give it to u. I will not represent u because of how u talk. I will
not give me rt ....
#32 ... You can file it and have 120 days to get a lawyer. I got a
paper so u can file it free. We can do to it tonite. Wen is Sofia
home?"

These text messages confirmed earlier discussions Respondent had with the
Martinezes; he was not their attorney. Regardless of the absence of an attorney
client relationship, with the mere desire to help the individuals out, he went to the
federal district court in Salt Lake City, UT, and waited for the Martinezes to show
up. He waited until 9:36 p.m. When they did not show up so he dropped the
complaint in the night deposit box. He instructed the Martinezes they could appear
in the morning when the court opened and sign it then. Respondent, by
volunteering to help the individuals to file a pro se complaint, did not create an
attorney client relationship. The three duties do not attach to Respondent's
conduct in the absence of the legal relationship.
Respondent terminated his attorney client relationship with the Martinezes
because he had been through six years of litigation against Utah County Sheriff
Deputy Skip Curtis for his alleged use of excessive force in causing injuries to
Vanessa Arnold when he threw her down the stairs at the Provo Towne Center
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movie theater. He had prevailed against the Utah County sheriff two times at the
10th Circuit, U.S.Court of Appeals. See ARNOLD v. CURTIS, U.S. Ct. App., 10th
Cir.No. 08-4064, (December 31, 2009); and Arnold v. Curtis, U.S. Ct. App., 10 th
Cir.No. 06-4080 (Aug. 1, 2007). Then, a jury ruled against Respondent's client at
a jury trial in April 2010. Respondent returned the file to the Martinezes eight
months before the statute of limitation ran because they were difficult clients to
work with, they refused to pay any costs for their litigation. Respondent had paid
out of his own pocket over $25,000 for the Arnold litigation. He was not ready to
go forward with litigation against the Salt Lake County SWAT team for the
Martinezes. See Prehearing Brief Re Sanctions, RP 266 at 278.
With regard to the finding of lack of competence, the finding by the trial
court only discusses an alleged lack of diligence by counsel. The court said
Respondent did not do work for the client until the SOL was about to run. The
court did not make any finding about Respondent demonstrating a lack of
knowledge or skill, nor did it find Respondent failed to be diligent in his analysis
and inquiry into the legal problem, or the methods of how to proceed. The trial
court did not analyze Respondent's conduct for lack of competence. This label
viJ

was simply applied by the OPC, and capriciously applied by the trial court. This
violation of conduct described in the finding of fact concerning lack of competence
is clearly covered more directly by conduct regulated under Rule 1.3, concerning
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diligence. The same conduct cannot violate two separate rules. Cf. Johnson v.
OPC, 2014 UT 57, para. 18. A lack of communication, per se, does not
demonstrate incompetence so this Court should dismiss the finding of a violation
of Rule 1.1. The trial court erred in finding these violations of the rules of
professional conduct with regard to the Martinezes because of the lack of a duty
owed by Respondent to them.

V. The district court erred in finding there were no mitigating factors
against the sanction of suspension and in imposing a two year suspension
on Respondent for violation of the rules of professional conduct.

The Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice govern, among
other things, the ethical practice of law in the State of Utah and provide the
standards for imposing sanctions on attorneys who violate the rules. See SUP. CT.
R. PROF'L PRAC. 1.0 to 8.5 ("Rules of Professional Conduct"), 14-601 to 14-607
("Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions"). Chapter fourteen, article 6 provides
the Utah State Bar with rules for imposing sanctions on attorneys who have
"engaged in professional misconduct." Id. 14-603(a). These rules are designed to
"maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those who
undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers." Id. l 4-602(b).
Further, the rules allow judges "flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions"
when a lawyer has committed misconduct. Id. 14-602(d). A court should consider
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specific factors when imposing sanctions, including "(a) the duty violated; (b) the
lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's
misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." Id. 14~

604(a)-( d).
The standard of review is this Court is free to decide what discipline is
appropriate for a lawyer, without deference to a trial court's findings. This Court
makes its own independent determination about the appropriate sanction in
attorney discipline cases. In re Discipline of Ennenga. 2001 UT 111, ,i,i 9-10, 37
P.3d 1150. Though the rules allow for flexibility in most cases, there are
presumptive sanctions for the most egregious types of misconduct. Suspension
may be imposed for a period of anywhere between six months and three years, but
the actual period of suspension should be subject to a degree of flexibility in fixing

~

the exact sanction, giving effect to mitigating and aggravating circumstances. In re
Discipline ofBabilis, 951 P.2d 207, 215 (UT S.Ct.1997).

A cooperative attitude in the disciplinary proceedings is a mitigating
factor., In re Cassity, 875 P.2d 548, 550 (1994). An attorney who takes
resopnsibilitiy, discloses his wrongdoings, and reforms bad behavior has a
mitigating effect if it happens before accusations have been made against him.
Cf. In re DisCIPLINE OF RASMUSSEN, 2013 UT 14, 299 P.3d 1050
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(2013); .. In re Discipline of/nee. 957 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Utah 1998)~ When a

lawyer does these things after he has been caught, he appears more sorry for
being caught than for the underlying conduct. Id at 1058.
This Comt has ruled against a recommended two year suspension in
favor of imposing a one year suspension. See In In re SMITH, 872 P.2d 447
(UT Sup.Ct. 1994), where conduct was illegal, his motives were dishonest,

and, as an experienced attorney, he perpetrated a fraud upon the court. But
before his misconduct was discovered he attempted to rectify the
consequences, he maintained a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, he
acknowledged the wrongful nature of his actions before the hearing panel and
he demonstrated remorse. Id. at 450. This Court held, under those
circumstances, that "a one-year suspension from the practice of law is
reasonably "appropriate to the offense" and adequately protects the public,
citing to In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1990). This Court noted that
as a practical matter, even "a short suspension from the practice is sufficient in
most cases to destroy an attorney's practice" and is therefore "tantamount to
disbarment." Id. at 810 n. 5. Smith, 872 P.2d at 450._
Here, Respondent showed remorse from the outset. He tried to set aside the
untrue requests for admissions. He carried the case through motions to set aside
judgements based upon the deemed admissions. He even appealed, hoping to
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correct the mistake. Remorse motivated the four year 1itigation. This attempt to
rectify occmTed before the OPC complaint, which arose in August 20 l 0.
Likewise, with Martinez, Respondent prepared a pro se complaint, drove to Salt
~

Lake from Orem, UT, repeatedly tried to rendeveau with the Martinezes and then
left them instructions of how to file it pro se. The only motive for such action was
to help the former client protect his opportunity to go forward with his civil rights
claim.
The trial court incorrectly found violations of Rules 8.4(c) and (d), and
based upon such error, failed to see any mitigating circumstances in favor of
Respondent. Such dismissal of mitigating factors was capricious. Respondent, at
least, cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings. Cassity, supra. All of
Respondent's efforts to mitigate the consequences of his negligence in Mercado

viJ

occurred before the bar complaints were against him. This Court should recognize
the existence of mitigating circumstances and strike the two year suspension.

VI.

The district court erred as a matter of law in denying Respondent's
motion to dismiss because of the delay in imposing sanctions in this
matter.

The standard of review is that this Supreme Court does not defer to the
lower court on issues of law. This Court does not owe any deference to the
trial court's interpretation of this court rule of practice. Nemelka, 212 P.3d at
527.
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Determinative law: S.Ct. R.Prof l. Practice, Rule 14-501 ( c ), (d) see appendix;
and Rule 14-511 ( f);, which reads:
( f) Sanctions hearing. Upon a finding of misconduct and as soon as
reasonably practicable, within a target date of not more than 30 days
after the district court enters its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, it shall hold a hearing to receive relevant evidence in aggravation
and mitigation, and shall within five days thereafter, enter an order
sanctioning the respondent. Upon reasonable notice to the parties, the
court, at its discretion, may hold the sanctions hearing immediately
after the misconduct proceeding.
The law required the district court to enter an order sanctioning Respondent
within five days after the sanctions hearing. S.Ct. R.Prof l. Practice, Rule 14511 (f). The district court entered the sanction against Respondent 4 months
after the sanctions hearing. The misconduct hearing was in January and March,
the sanctions hearing on April 6. But the order suspending Respondent was not
in effect until July 15, 2015.
The district court denied Respondent's motion to dismiss the sanction
because of this violation of the rule. It reasoned that it was free to impose the
sanction later because it had requested findings of fact and conclusions oflaw.
This Court does not owe any deference to the trial court's interpretation of this
court rule of practice. Nemelka, 212 P.3d at 527. The rule should be
interpreted in harmony with other similar rules in the same chapter. Id. At 528.
The rule allows the sanctions hearing to be held after entry of such findings, but
it does not excuse the judge from the time period in which he must impose the
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sanction. The rule should be interpreted according to its plain language, and, if
its ambiguous, according to the intent in the same chapter. Nemelka, supra.
Rule 14-501 (c), (d), clearly require the rule be interpreted to provide justice,
fairness, and a speedy resolution for Respondent. The plain language is that a
sanction must be imposed within five days after the sanctions hearing. The
language is clearly mandatory and compulsory. The purpose is to resolve
discipline issues as timely as possible, to settle the issues and let the
Respondent move on.
The trial court and OPC did not seek a fair, speedy resolution of these
matters. This matter was pending since 2010. The trial court clearly
disregarded any urgency to resolve the discipline issues against Respondent.
Respondent has been forced to practice law for the past five years of his 32 year
career under a cloud of concern for what was going to happen to him because
of his problems from 2009 when he was not sure what to do with his office.
Possibly, the OPC was delaying this prosecution until it secured a decision in
OPC v. STACEY A. Johnson, 2014 UT 57,342 P.3d 280 (filed Dec. 12, 2014),
so it would have that discipline to also throw against Respondent.
·vd

Conclusion containing a statement of the relief sought.

Respondent has dealt with one year of the suspension. Respondent's law
practice has disappeared. He was suspended before US CIS, the 9th Circuit, the
32

10th Circuit, the Utah Federal District, the Executive Office of Immigration
Review, U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Courts. He can
no longer appear with clients who are seeking visas, work permits, or citizenship.
His reputation is destroyed by a finding of dishonesty, fraud, and misrepresentation
and of causing prejudice to the administration of justice. This Court should
dismiss the violations of Rules 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and all violations with regard to the
Martinezes, especially the alleged wrong of lack of competence, in violation of
Rule 1.1.
Finally, this Court should find that the stay of suspension pending appeal
was improperly denied and the trial court erred in delaying the imposition of the
sanction too long. As a result, any appropriate sanction for the violations of Rules
1.1, 1.3, and 1.4(a) with regard to the Mercados should be deemed satisfied and
Respondent should be allowed to have his license to practice law restored.

[Signature of attorney or pro se party]
S. Austin Johnson, prose

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of May, 2016, I mailed by U.S. mail,
first class postage prepaid, and by electronic service to the below email address,
this
e2{. oi App al lol to opposing counsel at:

en·,

a"'c\

A~ ~"df

33

Billy Walker,
Esq. Diane
Akiyama, Esq.
Sharadee
Fleming, Esq.
Office of Professional
Conduct Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT el cf ti (

opcfiling@utahbar.org

A~()
~
S.Austin

·

Johnson

34

Form 17. Certificate of Compliance With Rule 24(f)(l)
Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limitation, Typeface Requirements, and Type
Style Requirements
1.
because:

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P.24(f)(l)

6, ·{:,

this brief contains [.s
5 (;J 1words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Utah R. App. P.24(f)(l)(B), or

□

2.
because:
□

□

Dated:

this brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains [state the number oj] lines of
text, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Utah R. App. P.24(f)(l)(B).
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P.27(b)

this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using [.
\JJ t> ~
\t,, '-" 13
. l in [ 7 I/if 15:,S
j)PI!' AA/ , P<,1,J- ltf., or

D

J

Np!"

this brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [state name and
version of word processing program} with [state name of characters per inch and
name of type styleJ.
.-

ji,( 4U-(

f 7/ ZOL6

35

~

